A detailed analysis by some experts who have been monitoring political events and developments etc in the Pacific Islands.
by Vuna.
This is their brief as cited in
http://www.undppc.org.fj/AuthorsEden Cole (DCAF)Thomas Shanahan (UNDP Pacific Centre)Dr. Philipp Fluri (DCAF)The analysis and recommendations reflected in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the UNDP, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) or the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). This publication is an independent publication commissioned by UNDP. It is the product of a collaborative effort by UNDP, PIFS and DCAF.
http://www.undppc.org.fj/_resources/article/files/Final%20SSG%20publication%2017%20Feb%202010.pdf..........................................
The PIF leaders’ decision involves implementation of two specific targeted measures, taken in accordance with the 2000 Biketawa Declaration. The first involves suspension of participation by the leader, ministers and officials of Fiji from all forum meetings and events arranged by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, including the annual Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. The second measure involves ensuring the military regime in Fiji does not benefit directly from forum regional cooperation initiatives or any new financial or technical assistance, other than assistance facilitating the restoration of democracy.92Security Sector Governance
ChallengesSince independence there have been serious challenges to civilian control of security institutions.
In 1987, the coalition of the newly formed Labour Party and the National Federation Party, led by Timoci Bavadra, won the general election and set about forming a government.
On May 14th 1987, one month after the government was formed, Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, third ranking military officer at the time, led a military coup, which resulted in the overthrow of the coalition government. It was the first action of its kind in the Pacific region.
On 28th September 1987, Rabuka perpetrated a second coup, subsequently proclaiming Fiji a Republic on 7th October 1987.
In 2000, a group lead by businessman George Speight executed a civilian takeover of parliament, deposing the democratically elected People’s Coalition Government led by Mahendra Chaudhry.
The coup was supported by the Counter Revolutionary Warfare unit of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) established by Rabuka during the 1987 coup.
The RFMF played a crucial but also controversial role in the response to the coup and returning Fiji to a constitutional path.93Following months of disagreements between the military and the government on 5th December 2006, military commander Commodore Bainimarama announced that he had assumed executive power, that he had dismissed the elected government of Fiji and declared a State of Emergency, justifying his actions principally by reference to the Doctrine of Necessity.
Subsequently, on 4 January 2007, Commodore Bainimarama returned executive authority to President Iloilo, who then appointed him as interim prime minister.
The commodore set a broad agenda of reform including: commitment to upholding the constitution, validating the legality of the military’s actions, an enquiry into the judiciary, investigation into alleged corruption by the ousted government (including plans to establish an anti-corruption commission), and the conduct of a census and the undertaking of electoral reforms, to precede the holding of a democratic election in an as yet unspecified timeframe.
This subsequently has been broadened further into the ‘People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Progress’, the overall objective of which is to “rebuild Fiji into a non-racial, culturally-vibrant and united, well-governed, truly democratic nation that seeks progress, and prosperity through merit-based equality of opportunity, and peace.”
The People’s Charter aims at providing a road map to address the underlying causes of instability, amending the constitution and in particular the electoral system. The People’s Charter process has received a mixed reaction from key stakeholder groups in Fiji and the region.
The reasons for the 2006 coup are hotly debated, which is a result of Fiji’s complex history and politics. Despite this, however, a number of issues have been highlighted:Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) attempts to pardon coup perpetrators of 2000;Attempts to remove Commodore Bainimarama from office and review of the RFMF;Police investigations of Commodore Bainimarama relating to sedition and his alleged role in the death
Enhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic FrameworkFiji
PART 2of four Country Revolutionary Warfare soldiers in 2000;
Introduction of alleged racially decisive legislation and the RFMF’s role in politics; andIssues relating to the conduct of the 2006 election and alleged widespread corruption.95Since the December 2006 coup there have been a number of processes initiated to try to resolve the political situation. At the regional level, following a decision by the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers’ Meeting an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) was tasked with visiting Fiji to meet all relevant parties to the current crisis and to make recommendations for a way forward, which they did from 29 January to 1 February 2007.
At the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers’ Meeting held in Port Vila on 16 March 2007, ministers agreed that:Depending on the willingness of the Fiji interim authorities to participate in the process, the Forum could move to the establishment of a joint working group of officials from Member countries, with Fiji, to engage with the interim government including on credible mechanisms for returning to democracy as soon as possible. The joint working group would report to the EPG.
In 2008, Fiji did not attend the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in Niue and for a period of four months ceased participation in the Pacific Islands Forum – Fiji Joint Working Group before resuming attendance in October 2008.
At a Special Leaders Retreat at the beginning of 2009, the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders called on the interim administration to take actions to demonstrate its commitment to the restoration of parliamentary democracy. Fiji did not respond to this call and also, again, ceased engagement in the Joint Working Group from the end of January 2009.
Following the purported abrogation of the constitution on 9th April 2009, and in accordance with the Port Moresby Forum Leaders’ Retreat outcome, the military regime was suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum effective immediately from 2nd May 2009.At the national level, former President Ratu Josefa Iloilo initiated the President’s Political Dialogue Forum (PPDF).
In this regard, a request was made to the Commonwealth Secretariat and the UN to facilitate the PPDF. Missions were undertaken by both organizations to explore ways in which support can be provided for inclusive and genuine political dialogue in the context of international efforts to help restore democratic order in Fiji, without prejudice as to the outcome.
A number of Leaders of Political Parties meetings were held to determine the terms of reference, scope of the PPDF and the selection of mediators, the last of which was on the day of the Court of Appeal decision regarding the legality of the interim administration. The agreed topics of discussion at that time included: a) the democratic experience in Fiji; b) electoral reform; and c) the People’s Charter.
However, since the events of Easter 2009 the PPDF has been abandoned and the regime had announced new processes for possible national dialogue, which involved restrictions on the scope of subjects and limits on eligibility for participation that would not meet international calls for Fiji authorities to pursue a genuinely inclusive dialogue without preconditions and pre-determined outcomes.
Looking into the future before and after the proposed elections in 2014, it is clear that inclusive dialogue needs to take place to agree on the following:The role of the RFMF in the affairs of the state.
This requires overcoming different interpretations. For example, the abrogated Fiji Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997, does not define the role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces except to say that “the Republic of Military Forces established by the Constitution of 1990 continues in existence.”
This leaves open claims that the repealed 1990 Constitution’s definition remains in force, namely: “It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well being of Fiji and its peoples.” According to the Forum Eminent Persons Group Report in 2007, this situation has led the RFMF to believe the “ConstitutionEnhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic Framework 106provides it with a political mandate to influence government policy in the interests of Fiji, however they may be defined.”
Before the 2006 coup, there was discussion of the president referring the case to the Supreme Court for clarification. Any new constitution will need to determine the role and responsibilities of the RFMF i.e., defending Fiji from external aggression; rationale and methods for their involvement in providing internal security; role and responsibilities of the police, prison service, customs and immigration; and the mandate for oversight of security institutions.Strategic security policy, which identifies national priorities, the values underlining the policy, the legal basis for the policy and the role of key actors.
Given the fragile relationships between the security services, political parties, chiefs, churches and CSOs, participatory consultations, dialogue and debate will be needed to ensure public confidence in the process and outcomes.The terms of reference, role and composition of the NSC and whether a parallel broader security forum should be created to include the views of civilian experts and relevant citizen groups.
The future role of parliament in overseeing security policy and institutions, including whether a specific committee on security is needed and how it can be a moderator between government and the security sector.The roles and responsibilities of the various accountability institutions (Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, Ombudsmen and Human Rights Commission) in dealing with complaints against and maladministration of security institutions.
OpportunitiesCurrently, there are very few SSG opportunities evident, which will remain the case until there is a restoration of democracy and human rights in Fiji.However, it is important to note that The People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Progress included a Working Group on the role of Fiji’s security forces in national development. The working group came up with a number of recommendations to reform law enforcement agencies and security institutions (see box 21).
With this in mind, the People’s Charter views are one of many possible views, which will need to be considered once the basic principles of SSG have been restored.National PrioritiesDuring the Regional Security Sector Governance Conference, each country delegation was given a chance to discuss their key priorities. The Fiji delegation provided the following, detailing key areas, activities and support required:There is a need to initiate discussion on the most effective security system in Fiji in order to provide good and just governance;These discussions need to be supported by dialogue, reviews, reforms, capacity building, and developing effective information and communication channels:In particular, an inclusive and result-oriented dialogue process is needed to start discussions on security sector governance;There is a need to build the capacity of parliament to deal with security governance issues in the future.
In specific terms:107 Enhancing Security Sector Governance in the Pacific Region: A Strategic FrameworkFiji PART 2The National Council for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) calls for a national dialogue on the RFMF’s role.
There are also a number of consequential recommendations for increasing ethnic and gender representation in the military, for parliamentary oversight of the military and for improving the relationship between the public at large and the military.Fiji’s national security policies should be reworked to take account of contemporary national security threats and the new paradigm of human security.
In addition, a comprehensive national security framework for systematic and participatory engagement between the state and its citizens should be put in place to bridge the gap between the state and the community. This framework will identify how state security institutions such as the police and military can take part in normal institutional engagement with civil society organisations, religious organisations and other community organisations in various programs.
This institutional engagement should be an ongoing process.The NCBBF proposes that the National Security Council expand its membership to incorporate wider representation — including the military and police, civil society organisations, women’s organisations, academic institutions and community groups.
In addition, mechanisms such as the National Intelligence Committee and the proposed National Peoples Charter Council should be established.Source: People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Progress Working Group on the Role of Fiji’s Security Forces in National Development.Recommendations – Working Group on the Role of Fiji’s Security Forces in National DevelopmentBox 21The term parliamentary responsibility needs to be defined;The terms of reference for committees needs to be defined;Effective participation in the work of committees needs to be ensured;The transparency of the parliamentary system will need to be enhanced; and The capacity building of parliament needs to be a component of a medium- to long-term governance enhancement strategy.
Theresa RalogaivauWednesday, August 11, 2010
"But none was forthcoming and then they started thinking about what they could do," he said. 
